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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, thousands of additional pieces of space debris were created and 
national security implications were on full display when China launched 
anti-satellite missiles to destroy a dilapidated weather satellite.1  Many 
countries were disturbed by the significant and relatively quick increase in 
dangerous space debris.2  However, a more troubling concern was the notion 
that the event was designed to show the intent of a strong China to go toe-to-
toe with a United States government that had articulated its prioritization of 
military capabilities in space.3  This singular event fused two significant 
international law issues: the threats posed by space debris and the 
ramifications of national security efforts in space.   
One year later, the European Union (EU) drafted a code of conduct that 
“call[ed] on member states to establish ‘policies and procedures to minimize 
the possibility of accidents . . . or any form of harmful interference with other 
States’ right to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.’ ”4  While 
initially receptive,5 the United States rejected the preliminary EU draft6 after 
concerns were raised by Congressional Republicans and military officials7 
that the code would be “too restrictive” on its reliance on satellites for 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Frank Morring, Jr., Worst Ever; Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Boosted Space-Debris 
Population by 10% in an Instant, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 12, 2007, at 20. 
 2 Carl Hoffman, China’s Space Threat: How Missiles Could Target U.S. Satellites, 
POPULAR MECHANICS (Dec. 18, 2009, 3:06 AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technolo 
gy/military/satellites/4218443; see generally CARL Q. CHRISTOL, Protection of the Space 
Environment — Debris and Power Sources, reprinted in THE USE OF AIRSPACE AND OUTER 
SPACE FOR ALL MANKIND IN THE 21ST CENTURY 253, 255 (Chia-Jui Cheng ed., 1995) (“The 
term ‘space debris’ does not appear in existing international agreements.  Over a period of 
time, it has been accepted that ‘debris’ is a popular rather than a legal term, that can best be 
described rather than defined.  [I]t has come to mean something with tangible physical 
characteristics, including non-functioning space objects, non-functioning component parts, 
fragments of satellites and rockets, engine exhaust particles, paint flakes, and similar items.”). 
 3 Hoffman, supra note 2, at 3. 
 4 MICAH ZENKO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLICY INNOVATION MEMORANDUM NO. 
10: A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE 2 (2011), available at http://www.cfr.org/space/code 
-conduct-outer-space/p26556 (quoting Council Annex II (EU) No. 17175/08 of 17 Dec. 2008, 
available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17175.en08.pdf [hereinafter 
Council Annex]). 
 5 Michael Listner, U.S. Rejects Current Draft of EU Code of Conduct; Considers Another 
Agreement, EXAMINER.COM (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/u-s-rejects-curr 
ent-draft-of-eu-code-of-conduct-considers-another-agreement. 
 6 Id.; Bill Gertz, New Space-Arms Control Initiative Draws Concern, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 
16, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/16/new-space-arms-control-initia 
tive-draws-concern/. 
 7 ZENKO, supra note 4, at 2. 
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national security efforts.8  However, the United States later announced that it 
would work with the EU and other space-faring countries to create an 
international code of conduct (ICOC) that would build upon the preliminary 
EU draft.9  Following the release of the latest draft in March of 2014, the 
United States reemphasized its commitment to an ICOC approach.10 
Negotiations are ongoing between all space-faring countries to address 
these issues through an ICOC regarding outer space activity.11  While the 
exact outcome of this process is undetermined, two things are certain: any 
international accord introducing rules for space activities will place some 
sort of restriction on future national defense maneuverability, and the United 
States is unlikely to bind itself to an international accord that it perceives to 
significantly weaken its national defense capabilities. 
Still, questions remain: Do the advantages that come with an ICOC 
approach outweigh the inherent limitations placed on U.S. national defense 
efforts?  Is it in the United States’ best interest to support the non-binding 
ICOC approach?  This Note argues that an ICOC approach is the best short-
term resolution to the long-term issue of space debris remediation.  An ICOC 
is better aligned with U.S. principles of space policy, and provides the best 
framework for achieving an immediate effect on the threat of space debris 
for all mankind, while allowing the United States the flexibility it requires 
for national security operations. 
Part II of this Note describes the threat space debris poses, and the policy 
approaches the United States has taken over the course of the last three 
decades.  Part II also details the four international treaties that comprise 
international space law, and their deficiencies in addressing the issue of 
space debris remediation.  Finally, Part II describes the strengths and 
weaknesses of the five most discussed approaches to a potential resolution, 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Listner, supra note 5; Marcus Weisgerber, U.S. Wants Changes to EU Space Code of 
Conduct, SPACENEWS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/18667u 
s-wants-changes-to-eu-space-code-of-conduct. 
 9 Press Release, U.S. Department of State, International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/181208. 
pdf; Listner, supra note 5; Gertz, supra note 6. 
 10 Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Remarks at the Conference on 
Disarmament Plenary (June 10, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2014/2273 
70.htm (“[T]he United States believes that European Union efforts to develop an International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities can serve as the best near-term mechanism for 
States to implement many of the [United Nations’ Group of Governmental Expert]’s 
recommendations.”). 
 11 Press Release, European Union, EU Launches Negotiations on an International Code of 
Conduct for Outer Space Activities (June 6, 2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa. 
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130649.pdf. 
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including a detailed chronology of recent developments involving the ICOC 
approach. 
In Part III, this Note discusses why an ICOC approach presents the most 
plausible resolution for the United States.  In doing so, Part III describes how 
the ICOC approach is best aligned with the national space priorities of the 
United States.  Finally, Part III explains how the ICOC approach is the best 
approach to produce short-term progress toward a long-term resolution. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Threats Presented by Space Debris 
In October 2009, astronauts aboard the International Space Station were 
told to prepare for impending doom when officials discovered that a 1/3 
inch-wide piece of mechanical debris from the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite 
weapons test was headed dangerously close to the station.12  Hurtling through 
space at up to 22,000 miles per hour,13 this tiny piece of metal presented a 
catastrophic threat to the astronauts.14  Fortunately, no impact occurred and 
the astronauts were able to resume their mission.15  However, the incident 
brought renewed attention to the persistent threat of extraterrestrial collisions 
between space objects and space debris.16  In an attempt to monitor this 
threat, experts track more than 22,000 debris items in space,17 representing 
“more than 95 percent of all man-made objects in Earth’s orbit.”18 
                                                                                                                   
 12 Glenn H. Reynolds, Space Junk and the Law of Space Collisions, POPULAR MECHANICS 
(Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/4303567; Mark 
Carreau, International Space Station Maneuvers to Avoid Chinese Satellite Debris, AVIATION 
WEEK: ON SPACE (Jan. 29, 2012, 1:45 AM), http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plck 
BlogId=Blog%3a04ce340e-4b63-4d23-9695-d49ab661f385&plckPostId=Blog%3a04ce340e-
4b63-4d23-9695-d49ab661f385Post%3ac7759791-6da2-4bbf-b9a8-016b50200289. 
 13 ZENKO, supra note 4, at 1. 
 14 Reynolds, supra note 12. 
 15 Id. 
 16 ZENKO, supra note 4, at 1; Michael Krepon, Space Diplomacy and an International Code of 
Conduct, E-INT’L RELATIONS (June 21, 2012), http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/21/space-diplo 
macy-and-an-international-code-of-conduct/; see also GIJSBERTHA C.M. RIEJNEN, THE 
POLLUTION OF OUTER SPACE, IN PARTICULAR OF THE GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT 38 (1989) (“Present 
and future space operations are, therefore, threatened by space debris of many sorts.”). 
 17 ZENKO, supra note 4, at 1. 
 18 Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Proposal for A 
Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589 (2011). 
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In addition to the threat of impact posed by each piece of space debris, 
there also exists the threat of the “cascade effect.”19  This is the “process by 
which space debris will become self-generating and therefore 
uncontrollable.”20  Through a chain reaction, colliding space debris 
propagates further debris, exacerbating the problem.21  This catastrophic 
scenario was the central plot in the 2013 movie Gravity, which portrayed the 
complete destruction of an American space shuttle, the suffocation of the 
crew onboard, and the forced detachment of a space-walking astronaut left 
tumbling into space.22  Although this Academy Award-winning drama was 
purely fictional, the threat posed by cascading space debris is very real. 
These hazards present a clear threat to national security, especially for the 
United States.23  The United States is more dependent than any other country 
upon the ability to use space for unobstructed national security purposes.24  
In particular, the United States’ reliance on satellites for national security 
creates grave concerns about the potential for sabotage caused by the adverse 
effects of space debris.25 
B.  U.S. Response to the Threat of Space Debris 
1.   The 1980s as a Foundation for Interagency Cooperation 
In light of the potentially catastrophic national security ramifications, the 
United States government has made the issue of space debris a permanent 
part of U.S. space policy.26  As one of the leading space-faring nations, the 
United States began in the early 1980s to lead the international community in 
                                                                                                                   
 19 HOWARD A. BAKER, SPACE DEBRIS: LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 13 (1989).  The 
cascade effect is also referred to as the “Kessler Syndrome,” after NASA scientist Donald 
Kessler.  Imburgia, supra note 18, at 597 n.53. 
 20 BAKER, supra note 19. 
 21 Imburgia, supra note 18, at 597. 
 22 GRAVITY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2013). 
 23 Imburgia, supra note 18, at 608. 
 24 Id. at 592 (quoting Jean-Michel Stoullig, Rumsfeld Commission Warns Against “Space Pearl 
Harbor,” SPACE DAILY (Jan. 11, 2001), http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-01b.html). 
 25 Id. at 608–11; MICHAEL ZENKO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
MEMORANDUM NO. 21: DANGEROUS SPACE INCIDENTS 4–5 (2014), available at http://i.cfr.org/co 
ntent/publications/attachments/CPA_ContingencyMemo_21.pdf (“[Forty-three] percent of all 
active satellites are U.S. owned. . . . Moreover, although space debris threatens all international 
space assets, the United States depends especially on satellites in the portions of [low earth orbit] 
where the greatest debris is found for encrypted communications, reconnaissance over 
Afghanistan, missile defense, and other missions critical to national security.”). 
 26 BAKER, supra note 19, at 111. 
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addressing the issue of space debris through comprehensive national policy.27  
The result was an integrated national policy that cut across national space 
and security programs.28  
In 1981, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
proposed a Space Debris Assessment Program Plan that sought to determine 
the magnitude of the space debris threat and develop a system to address it.29  
This proposal included a ten-year plan and called for the subsequent creation 
of international agreements to address the issue.30  Following this proposal, 
NASA instituted a policy in 1982 that was specifically aimed at the reduction 
of space debris.31 
The U.S. government began incorporating space debris policy in its 
regulation of the commercial space launch industry in 1984 with the 
Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA).32  In addition to providing the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) with authority to regulate private 
commercial launches, the CSLA empowered the DOT to compel compliance 
of commercial space explorers with space debris policy.33  That same year, 
Congress gave the Department of Commerce power, through the Land 
Remote Sensing Commercialization Act, to compel the removal of 
decommissioned satellites from orbit.34 
                                                                                                                   
 27 Christopher D. Williams, Space: The Cluttered Frontier, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1139, 1166 
(1995). 
 28 See id. at 1166–76 (detailing how a national policy has emerged from the efforts of 
various federal government agencies); Irene Atney-Yurdin, Space Debris Legal Research 
Guide, 3 PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 167, 171–76 (1991) (detailing federal policy statements 
concerning space debris); BAKER, supra note 19, at 111 (“Until US President Ronald Reagan 
announced his revised national space policy in February 1988, law and policy on space refuse 
varied according to the regime.  Since then, a more co-ordinated approach to the space refuse 
issue has been developing.”). 
 29 Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 174 (citing BAKER, supra note 19, at 71). 
 30 Id. (citing NASA Conference Publication 2360, Orbital Debris 8–9, 16–17, 1985, 
available at http://naca.larc.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19850012878&qs=N%3D4294950110%2 
B4294961077%2B4294891361); Williams, supra note 27, at 1166 (citing BAKER, supra note 
19, at 112). 
 31 Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 174 (citing Orbital Space Debris: Hearing Before the 
Sub-Committee on Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology of the House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1988) [hereinafter 
Hearing]; Statement of Joseph B. Mahon, Deputy Associate Administrator for Flight Systems, 
Office of Space Flight, NASA, at 18). 
 32 Williams, supra note 27, at 1169–70 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601–2623 (1988 & Supp. 
V 1993)).  See Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 176 (describing how the CSLA allows the 
DOT to regulate private commercial launches). 
 33 Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 176 (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 400–415); Williams, supra note 
27, at 1170 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 401.1 (1993)). 
 34 Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 177 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 4242(b)(3)). 
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The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) instituted a comprehensive 
analysis of the threat debris posed to national security when it commissioned 
the United States Air Force Science Advisory Board (SAB) to conduct a 
thorough study of the issue in 1986.35  Among the SAB’s recommendations 
was a call for the creation of an international commission and the redesign of 
military weapon systems to minimize the creation of additional debris.36  The 
study stopped short, however, of calling for the elimination of debris 
generation that was inconsistent with the interests of U.S. national security.37 
Following the SAB’s recommendations, the DOD signed a policy 
statement in 1987 that stated: “DOD will seek to minimize the impact of 
space debris on its military operations.  Design and operations of DOD space 
tests, experiments and systems will strive to minimize or reduce 
accumulation of space debris consistent with mission requirements.”38  In 
doing so, the United States became the first major space-faring nation to 
acknowledge the threat presented by space debris upon the use of outer 
space.39  This acknowledgement occurred alongside NASA’s development of 
radar and computer systems with the ability to track space debris.40 
In 1988, President Ronald Reagan issued the “first public statement by 
the chief executive officer of a major space power on the subject of space 
[debris].”41  He did so by signing the National Space Policy of 1988, an 
update to previous versions that stated: “All space sectors will seek to 
minimize the creation of space debris.  Design and operations of space tests, 
experiments and systems will strive to minimize or reduce accumulation of 
space debris consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness.”42  
The National Space Policy went further than the DOD policy, committing to 
minimize not only the “impact of space debris” but its “creation” as well.43 
                                                                                                                   
 35 BAKER, supra note 19, at 115 (citing Special Report of the United States Air Force 
Scientific Board Ad Hoc Committee on Current and Potential Technology to Protect Air Force 
Space Missions from Current and Future Debris (1987)). 
 36 Id. at 115–16. 
 37 Id. at 116. 
 38 Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 175 (quoting Hearing, supra note 31, at 16; Interagency 
Group (Space), Report on Orbital Debris 18 (1989)); Williams, supra note 27, at 1168 
(quoting Gunnar Leinberg, Orbital Space Debris, 4 J.L. & TECH. 93, 107 (1989)). 
 39 BAKER, supra note 19, at 116; Williams, supra note 27, at 1168 (quoting Bruce L. 
McDermott, Outer Space: The Latest Polluted Frontier, 36 A.F. L. REV. 143, 145 (1992)). 
 40 BAKER, supra note 19, at 113. 
 41 Id. at 120. 
 42 Id. at 118 (quoting Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Fact Sheet: National 
Space Policy 1 (Jan. 26, 1988) [hereinafter National Space Policy 1988]). 
 43 Williams, supra note 27, at 1174; see also supra notes 36, 42 and accompanying text 
(quoting language from 1987 DOD policy and National Space Policy of 1988). 
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As part of the revised National Space Policy, NASA and DOD officials 
co-chaired an interagency working group tasked with formulating policy 
recommendations for the National Security Council.44  The group’s final 
report was submitted in 1989, and called for continued interagency research 
on the debris environment and minimization of new space debris caused by 
future space missions.45  The work of this interagency group represented a 
forward-looking commitment by the U.S. government to sustained 
interagency cooperation on the issue of space debris.46 
2.  U.S. Principles of Space Policy Beyond 2000 
The foundation laid by the U.S. government’s policies throughout the 
1980s led to a more nuanced national space policy in the first decade of the 
2000s.47  This is particularly true with regard to national security 
maneuverability.   
Congress established a bipartisan commission in 2000, chaired by the 
soon-to-be Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and tasked it with assessing 
the national security of space activities.48  The commission released its final 
report in 2001.49  Among its recommendations, the commission called for the 
creation of an “under-secretary of defense for space, intelligence, and 
information.”50  In addition, the commission expressed the intent that “the 
President . . . have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to 
and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests.”51 
Under the Obama Administration, the National Space Policy of 2010 
reflects the U.S. intent to maintain maneuverability in space for national 
security purposes.52  The Policy lists as one of its core principles the notion 
                                                                                                                   
 44 Williams, supra note 27, at 1174–75; Leinberg, supra note 38, at 106 (citing Hearing, 
supra note 31, at 7). 
 45 Williams, supra note 27, at 1175–76 (citing Robert L. Bridge & Milton L. Smith, Space 
Debris: A Role for Lawyers?, Proc. 33d COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 266, 266–67 (1990)); 
BAKER, supra note 19, at 119. 
 46 BAKER, supra note 19, at 118 (quoting National Space Policy 1988, supra note 42). 
 47 Joanne I. Gabrynowicz, One Half Century and Counting: The Evolution of U.S. National 
Space Law and Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 415 (2010). 
 48 Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and 
Organization, Report (2001), http://space.au.af.mil/space_commission/executive_summary.pdf 
[hereinafter Commission]. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 32; Stoullig, supra note 24. 
 51 Commission, supra note 48, at 12. 
 52 Office of Technology & Science Policy, National Space Policy of the United States of 
America 3 (2010) [hereinafter National Space Policy of 2010].  
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that: “All nations have the right to explore and use space for peaceful 
purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity, in accordance with 
international law.  Consistent with this principle, ‘peaceful purposes’ allows 
for space to be used for national and homeland security activities.”53  The 
Policy also proclaims:  
The United States will employ a variety of measures to help 
assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, 
consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others 
from interference and attack, defend our space systems and 
contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if 
deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.54 
Subsequent to the launch of the National Space Policy of 2010, the DOD 
announced in 2011 the creation of a National Space Security Strategy.55  The 
DOD’s announcement re-emphasized the notion that “[s]pace is crucial for 
military operations and intelligence collection, but it is increasingly 
congested with satellites, orbital debris, and radiofrequency interference.”56  
The DOD intended to use this strategy to “promote norms of behavior to 
bring order to a congested domain[,] [and] develop international partnerships 
to operate in coalitions and reinforce military space capabilities.”57  Together 
with the National Space Policy of 2010, DOD’s National Space Security 
Strategy encompasses current national space policy aimed at addressing 
space debris. 
C.  Governing International Law and its Weaknesses 
Four international space law treaties govern the convergence of space 
debris and national security issues: (1) the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (Limited Test Ban 
Treaty);58 (2) the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Press Release, U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Announces the National Security 
Space Strategy (Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?rele 
aseid=14245. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
under Water, October 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Limited Test 
Ban Treaty]. 
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the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other 
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty);59 (3) the Convention on the 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability 
Convention);60 and (4) the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space (Registration Convention).61  While each of these treaties 
contains significant flaws in addressing the threats presented by space debris, 
each is important in understanding the historical legal framework 
international space law has employed regarding the issue.62 
1.  The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty 
The Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits nuclear weapons tests in 
the atmosphere and outer space, entered into force on October 10, 1963 after 
an eight-year process.63  In an attempt to prevent radioactive waste from 
spreading around the globe,64 the Limited Test Ban Treaty obligated parties 
to prevent nuclear testing within the jurisdictions under their control.65  
However, it also provided members with the power to withdraw their support 
of the Treaty in favor of national interests.66  In his Address to the Nation on 
July 26, 1963, President John F. Kennedy highlighted the non-binding nature 
of the Treaty in an attempt to assuage any fears that U.S. hands would be tied 
in the event of nuclear testing by other countries: 
                                                                                                                   
 59 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (entered into force 
Oct. 10, 1967). 
 60 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for 
signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
 61 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature 
Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]. 
 62 Imburgia, supra note 18, at 611. 
 63 Narrative, U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in 
Outer Space and Under Water, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2015). 
 64 Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 58, at pmbl (“Seeking to achieve the discontinuance 
of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to 
this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive 
substances . . . .”). 
 65 Id. art. I, § 1 (“Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and 
not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any 
place under its jurisdiction or control . . . .”). 
 66 Id. art. IV (“Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to 
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter 
of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”). 
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Under this limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other 
nations could never be sufficient to offset the ability of our 
strategic forces to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to 
penetrate and destroy an aggressor’s homeland. 
 We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, the 
nuclear strength that we need.67 
2.  The 1967 Outer Space Treaty 
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is generally held as “the most important 
treaty governing space.”68  As a fundamental principle of policy, the Treaty 
declares outer space to be the global commons of all nations, stating: 
 The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit 
and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree 
of economic or scientific development, and shall be the 
province of all mankind. 
 Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
shall be free for exploration and use by all States without 
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in 
accordance with international law, and there shall be free 
access to all areas of celestial bodies.69 
Further, the Outer Space Treaty seeks to hold nations accountable to the 
international community for their activities in outer space,70 in part to avoid 
“harmful contamination” of space.71  The Treaty also holds nations 
                                                                                                                   
 67 President John F. Kennedy, Address to the Nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (July 
26, 1963) (transcript available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ZNOo49DpRUa-kM 
etjWmSyg.aspx). 
 68 Imburgia, supra note 18, at 613 (citing Adam G. Quinn, The New Age of Space Law: The 
Outer Space Treaty and the Weaponization of Space, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 475, 479, 487 
(2008)); Joel Stroud, Space Law Provides Insights on How the Existing Liability Framework 
Responds to Damages Caused by Artificial Outer Space Objects, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 
J. 363, 370 (2002). 
 69 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 59, art. I. 
 70 Id. art. VI (“States [that are] Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility 
for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether 
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and 
for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth 
in the present Treaty.”). 
 71 Id. art. IX. 
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“internationally liable for damage” caused by objects they have launched or 
caused to be launched into space.72 
3.  The 1972 Liability Convention 
The international treaty that is the most relevant to the issue of space 
debris is the Liability Convention of 1972.73  This Treaty expands upon the 
liability regime established in the Outer Space Treaty74 by holding: “A 
launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage 
caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft flight.”75  
Included in this are “component parts of a space object as well as its launch 
vehicle and parts thereof.”76  To trigger liability there must exist fault,77 as 
well as damage consisting of “loss of life, personal injury or other 
impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of 
persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental 
organizations.”78 
4.  The 1975 Registration Convention 
The Registration Convention of 1975 sought to further develop the 
Liability Convention by aiding nations in identifying the launching party of 
space objects that have caused them damage.79  To do so, it required:  
When a space object is launched into earth orbit or beyond, the 
launching State shall register the space object by means of an 
entry in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain.  Each 
                                                                                                                   
 72 Id. art. VII. 
 73 Atney-Yurdin, supra note 28, at 182. 
 74 Imburgia, supra note 18, at 616 (citing Michael W. Taylor, Trashing the Solar System 
One Planet at a Time: Earth’s Orbital Debris Problem, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 26 
(2007)); see supra note 72 and accompanying text (describing that nations would be held 
liable under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty for damage caused by their space objects). 
 75 Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. II. 
 76 Id. art. I(d). 
 77 Id. art. III; Imburgia, supra note 18, at 617 (“More importantly, even if the terms of the 
Liability Convention do encompass space debris, it does nothing to deter debris creation, 
because the Liability Convention requires fault before liability can be assessed.”). 
 78 Liability Convention, supra note 60, art. I(a). 
 79 Registration Convention, supra note 61, at pmbl. (“Recalling further that the Convention 
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 29 March 1972 establishes 
international rules and procedures concerning the liability of launching States for damage 
caused by their space objects . . . [and] Desiring also to provide for States Parties additional 
means and procedures to assist in the identification of space objects . . . .”). 
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launching State shall inform the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations of the establishment of such a registry.80  
5.  Insufficiencies of Governing International Law  
The current regime of treaties comprising international space law contains 
two major insufficiencies that present challenges to the effective 
management of space debris for national security maneuverability.  First, 
these treaties neither define nor describe “space debris.”81  Rather, the 
treaties discuss regulations that deal with fully functional “space objects.”82  
While “space debris” remains a popular term rather than a legal one,83 some 
believe that it can be read into the legally defined term “space object.”84  
However, this assertion is disputed and the need for international guidance 
on how to address “debris” remains.85  
Further, the current regime presents jurisdictional obstacles for any 
attempt to mitigate the risks caused by space debris.86  While a country will 
be held liable for any injury caused by its objects placed in space, under 
current international law, it cannot be prevented “from contaminating outer 
space.”87  In addition, the current legal regime provides a country with 
permanent control and ownership over its objects once placed in space.88  
This creates significant challenges to “the removal of space [debris] by any 
entity other than the State of registration.”89  
                                                                                                                   
 80 Id. art. II, § 1. 
 81 BAKER, supra note 19, at 61; CARL Q. CHRISTOL, Outer Space Exploitability: International 
Law and Developing Nations, 6 SPACE POLICY 146, 146–60 (1991), reprinted in CARL Q. 
CRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 289, 306 (1991); CHRISTOL, supra note 2, at 
255; Leinberg, supra note 38, at 101; Imburgia, supra note 18, at 621 (citation omitted). 
 82 See BAKER, supra note 19, at 63–64, 67 (describing the historical use and scope of “space 
object”); CHRISTOL, supra note 2, at 255–56 (describing the definition of “space object” in 
Article I(d) of the Liability Convention); CHRISTOL, supra note 81, at 253–54 (describing use 
of “space object” in the Rescue and Return Agreement, Liability Convention, and Moon 
Agreement); Leinberg, supra note 38, at 101 (describing various uses of “space object” and its 
implication on the meaning of “space debris”). 
 83 CHRISTOL, supra note 2, at 255. 
 84 Leinberg, supra note 38, at 101. 
 85 Id.; BAKER, supra note 19, at 63. 
 86 BAKER, supra note 19, at 67–71. 
 87 RIEJNEN, supra note 16, at 55. 
 88 BAKER, supra note 19, at 69 (citations omitted). 
 89 Id. at 71; see Gerry Oberst, Legal Issues for Space Debris Removal, SATELLITE TODAY 
(Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.satellitetoday.com/via/globalreg/38524.html (describing a report 
from the Third Int’l Interdisciplinary Space Debris Congress held in Nov. 2011). 
2014] THE EMPIRE CAN STILL STRIKE BACK  891 
 
D.  Attempt at International Resolution 
While the United States has moved forward with domestic projects to 
protect its assets from the threat of space debris, it continues to recognize the 
futility of any actions that are not a part of a larger international strategy.90  
Multiple options exist to tackle the issue of space debris management 
through international cooperation, including: (1) a binding international 
agreement; (2) a voluntary regime of individual national policies; (3) a 
United Nations based approach; (4) an international intergovernmental 
organization, and (5) an ICOC approach.91 
1.  A Binding International Agreement 
A binding international accord among space-faring countries could 
strongly influence the actions of those countries by providing enforceable 
regulatory provisions.92  However, this approach is not seen as a practical 
solution due to the slow negotiations process of the United Nations.93  
Moreover, active opposition within the Legal Subcommittee of the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space further indicates 
that an international treaty approach is likely implausible.94 
                                                                                                                   
 90 Most recently, on June 2, 2014, DOD announced the awarding of a $915 million contract 
to Lockheed Martin to build a network of high-frequency radar systems that will comprise a 
“space fence.”  Christian Davenport, Lockheed Martin Wins Space Fence Contract, WASH. 
POST, June 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/lockheed-martin-win 
s-space-fence-contract/2014/06/02/f302413e-ea97-11e3-93d2-edd4be1f5d9e_story.html. 
 91 Steven A. Mirmina, Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives to a 
Legally Binding Instrument, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 649, 654 (2005); Imburgia, supra note 18, at 
591 (describing a binding international agreement approach); CARL Q. CHRISTOL, Alternative 
Models for a Future International Space Organization, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH 
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 173–80 (1982), reprinted in SPACE LAW: PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note 81, at 427–28. 
 92 Imburgia, supra note 18, at 633–34. 
 93 Mirmina, supra note 91, at 652; McDermott, supra note 39, at 652 (“Five years of 
negotiations were required to produce the Principles Treaty, ten years for the Liability 
Convention[,] and nine years for the Outer Space Treaty.” (citing CARL Q. CHRISTOL, 
Methodology and the Development of International Space Law, HAKUMUM ANKASA DAN 
PERKEMBANGANNYA 19, 19–28 (Univ. of Padjadjaran, 1989), reprinted in SPACE LAW: PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note 81, at 349–56)). 
 94 Mirmina, supra note 91, at 652–53 (“The primary basis for the opposition has been that 
further work in necessary to understand the technical aspects of space debris.”). 
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2.  A Voluntary Regime of Individual National Policies 
A voluntary adherence regime would call on space-faring countries to 
implement domestic policies that aligned with an independent set of 
technical guidelines that are scientifically based and drafted by an 
international coalition of member states.95  This approach allows for a 
maximum amount of national sovereignty, providing individual countries 
with the flexibility to implement international guidelines in a domestically 
friendly manner.96  However, increased national sovereignty also presents a 
significant drawback to this approach, as a country’s failure to comply would 
provide the international community with no effective enforcement device 
other than public censure.97  
3.  A United Nations Based Approach 
A third approach involves using the framework of the United Nations to 
develop technical guidelines by which Member States would agree to 
abide.98  These guidelines would be achieved through a drafting and adoption 
process by the United Nation’s Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer 
Space (COPUOS) and its subcommittees, particularly the Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee (STSC).99  This process could potentially involve 
the adoption of existing guidelines regarding space debris minimization, such 
as those recommended by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination 
Committee in 2002.100 
The advantages of this approach include the fact that all major space-
faring nations are members of the STSC.101  Therefore, each would have 
some control over the guideline-generating process, as the STSC reaches its 
decisions based upon member consensus.102  However, a significant pitfall to 
this approach is the makeup of the United Nations.103  Since its membership 
consists of only countries, individual governments would be the only entities 
                                                                                                                   
 95 Id. at 656. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id. at 657. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 653–54 (“The IADC is an international forum in which more than one hundred 
experts from eleven space-faring nations meet regularly to exchange information on orbital 
debris research and to identify debris mitigation options.” (citation omitted)). 
 101 Id. at 658. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
2014] THE EMPIRE CAN STILL STRIKE BACK  893 
 
allowed control over the ratification of proposed recommendations.104  
Private actors and individual space agencies would be precluded from direct 
participation in the drafting process.105  In addition, an attempt to produce 
guidelines that can muster enough support to pass the STSC’s consensus 
threshold presents the threat of a prolonged effort that might produce only 
watered-down and ineffective guidelines.106 
4.  An International Intergovernmental Organization 
In contrast, some have called for the development of a new international 
organization made up of individual member states, provided with the general 
and wide-ranging power to enforce the international legal regime of space 
law.107  This international organization would possess a “legal personality,” 
allowing it to “act as a formal instrumentality of government.”108  Specific 
functions of the organization could include independent investigations of 
space debris and the implementation of a space debris tariff on space-faring 
nations.109  
However, this approach presents numerous concerns.110  A primary 
obstacle to overcome is a demonstration of need for an additional 
international group, and what its role would be alongside other international 
organizations such as the United Nations.111  Other primary considerations 
include determining structural characteristics of the group, such as the 
method for decision-making,112 determination of the organization’s 
jurisdiction,113 and whether private actors would be granted access.114 
                                                                                                                   
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 CHRISTOL, supra note 91, at 428–29. 
 108 Id. at 429. 
 109 REIJNEN, supra note 16, at 65–66. 
 110 CHRISTOL, supra note 91, at 440–41 (listing fifteen issues that must be addressed at the 
creation of any new international intergovernmental organization). 
 111 Id. at 438–39. 
 112 Id. at 433–36. 
 113 Id. at 437–38 (describing the need for the organization to have a judicial arm). 
 114 Id. at 441. 
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5.  An International Code of Conduct 
  a.  Overview of ICOC Approach 
International experts working through the United Nations have suggested 
that an ICOC might be the best short-term solution.115  This approach 
presents several advantages, the most significant of which is speed.116  
Because this approach would involve drafting an agreement between private 
entities that opt-in to adherence, it bypasses the lengthy delay inherent in 
reaching agreement among a group of potentially reluctant national 
governments, such as that which would be required in a voluntary adherence 
regime or United Nations approach.117  In addition, because this approach 
would take place outside the confines of an intergovernmental organization, 
it allows for participation of private operators in the negotiation process, 
encompassing a wider scope of parties to be bound by the agreement.118   
Further, this approach has been used successfully in the past.119  In 1972, 
the United States and the former Soviet Union entered into an ICOC to 
prevent threatening movements between warships and submarines.120  
Similarly, President George H.W. Bush utilized an ICOC in 1989 to establish 
normed operating procedures for the military forces of the United States and 
the former Soviet Union that were in close proximity to each other.121  In 
addition, during his presidency, George W. Bush entered into agreements 
regarding arms proliferation using two ICOCs.122 
Moreover, there exists a successful track record for using the ICOC 
approach with respect to recent space activities.  In 2005, partner states 
reached an agreement regarding procedures for the International Space 
Station crew utilizing an ICOC approach.123  In addition, in 2007, a private 
entity created an ICOC among representative organizations from five space-
                                                                                                                   
 115 Mirmina, supra note 91, at 659. 
 116 Id. at 659–60. 
 117 Id. at 659. 
 118 Id. at 660. 
 119 Id.  
 120 Krepon, supra note 16; Agreement Between the Government of The United States of 
America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of 
Incidents On and Over the High Seas, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 25, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 1168, 
available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm. 
 121 Krepon, supra note 16; Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., June 12, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 877, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20693340. 
 122 Krepon, supra note 16. 
 123 Mirmina, supra note 91, at 660 (citing Code of Conduct for the International Space 
Station Crew, 14 C.F.R. § 1214.403 (2005)). 
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faring countries to address the prevention of collisions and risky operations 
in space.124  This group highlighted its approach as an initial step toward a 
more formal international treaty, saying: “[t]he choice between a code of 
conduct and an international convention is not mutually exclusive.  To the 
contrary, executive agreements establishing a code of conduct to prevent 
dangerous military practices in space could facilitate the eventual negotiation 
of a multilateral treaty that is more ambitious in scope.”125 
This approach does, however, present drawbacks.126  First, because 
adoption of an ICOC takes place outside the auspices of an 
intergovernmental organization, domestic adoption by individual national 
governments is not guaranteed.127  Second, multiple ICOCs may present 
competing recommendations.128  However, since the purpose of an ICOC is 
to produce a measure to encourage immediate action rather than an ultimate 
resolution, competing ICOCs will not necessarily mitigate the efficacy of one 
another.129 
  b.  Recent Developments: Battle of the Codes 
A draft ICOC was promulgated by the EU in 2008 to address the 
international issue of space debris.130  The EU draft was designed by 
“[t]aking into account that space debris could constitute a threat to outer 
space activities and potentially limit the effective deployment and 
exploitation of associated space capabilities.”131  The EU draft was later 
amended and a new draft was proposed in December 2010.132   
While initial signs indicated U.S. support for the EU draft, Ellen 
Tauscher, the U.S. Undersecretary for Arms Control and International 
Security, announced on January 12, 2012 that the United States would not be 
                                                                                                                   
 124 Model Code of Conduct for Space-Faring Nations (Oct. 2007), available at http://www. 
stimson.org/books-reports/model-code-of-conduct-for-space-faring-nations/. 
 125 Key Element: Supporting a Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations, Key 
Elements of Space Assurance, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, http://www.stimson.org/research-
pages/key-elements-of-space-assurance-/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2013). 
 126 Mirmina, supra note 91, at 660–61. 
 127 Id. at 660. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 660–61. 
 130 Council Annex, supra note 4. 
 131 Id. at pmbl. 
 132 Michael Listner, EU Council Supports an International Code of Conduct, SPACE SAFETY 
MAGAZINE (May 31, 2012, 3:53 PM), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/2012/05/31/eu-
council-adopts-international-code-conduct/. 
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supporting the current draft of the EU ICOC.133  In her announcement, 
Undersecretary Tauscher cited concerns that the EU ICOC would be “too 
restrictive” on U.S. national security policy,134 a concern echoed by 
Congressional Republicans and military officials.135  In particular, U.S. 
Senator Jeff Sessions highlighted this concern during a Congressional 
hearing on military space programs, saying, “We’ve advanced further 
technologically and in development and actually [sic] deployment of systems 
than anyone else, and agreements, codes of conduct, tend to . . . constrain our 
military.  And our military is fundamentally configured so it depends on 
space capability.”136  Five days after rejecting the EU draft, the United States 
announced that it would seek to negotiate its own ICOC with the broader 
international community.137 
Congressional opposition was reemphasized the following day when four 
Congressional Republicans issued a letter to President Obama expressing 
their concerns over the Administration’s announcement regarding support of 
an ICOC.138  Among these were a fear that an ICOC would thwart U.S. 
national security efforts and the concern that an ICOC would prove toothless 
against “irresponsible” countries such as the People’s Republic of China.139  
In addition, the Congressmen also expressed concern over a perception that 
President Obama might bypass Congress in seeking an agreement on an 
ICOC.140  
This public disapproval of the Administration’s announcement was 
further enhanced by two subsequent events.  John R. Bolton and John C. 
Yoo, key Republicans and former senior officials under President George W. 
Bush, co-authored an op-ed in the March 8, 2012 New York Times that was 
strongly critical of the Obama Administration and the EU ICOC in 
                                                                                                                   
 133 Listner, supra note 5; Gertz, supra note 6. 
 134 Listner, supra note 5; Gertz, supra note 6. 
 135 Listner, supra note 5; Weisgerber, supra note 8; ZENKO, supra note 4. 
 136 Hearing to Receive Testimony on Military Space Programs in Review of the Defense 
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2012 and the Future Years Defense Program Before the 
Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the S. Comm. on Armed Forces, 112 Cong. 14 (2011) 
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the S. 
Comm. on Armed Forces) [hereinafter Defense Hearing]. 
 137 Press Release, supra note 9. 
 138 Michael Listner, Congress Draws a Legal Line in the Sand Over the Code of Conduct, 
EXAMINER.COM (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/congress-draws-a-legal-line-
the-sand-over-the-code-of-conduct. 
 139 Id.; Press Release, Congressman Michael Turner, Turner Statement on the Administration’s 
Intention to Sign onto EU Code of Conduct for Space (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://turner. 
house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=275084. 
 140 Listner, supra note 138. 
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general.141  In criticizing an ICOC approach, the authors asserted, “American 
security must not be sacrificed for the false promises of global 
governance.”142  A few weeks later, Congress debated the 2013 DOD 
funding bill that included a specific prohibition against “implement[ing] or 
comply[ing] with an international agreement concerning outer space 
activities unless such agreement is ratified by the Senate or authorized by 
statute.”143  While the outcome of these public dissents is not immediately 
relevant, it is clear that Republicans in Congress remain cautious of 
supporting an ICOC approach, but are intent on using whatever means they 
can to ensure a role in any ICOC adoption process.144  
Just as the United States endorsed starting an ICOC drafting process 
anew, the EU provided further support behind its own draft ICOC.145  On 
May 29, 2012, the EU Council formally supported its ICOC proposal,146 and 
it appeared that a “battle of the codes” was quickly developing.147  However, 
the EU convened two rounds of Open-ended Consultations in Kiev in May 
2013 and Bangkok in November 2013, allowing 140 participants from sixty-
one different countries to offer comments and suggestions.148  A third 
Consultation round was held in May 2014 in Luxembourg.149  Following 
each Consultation round, a new draft ICOC has been issued that incorporates 
international feedback.150  While domestic and international observers 
continue to point out weaknesses in the ICOC drafts,151 the United States 
                                                                                                                   
 141 John R. Bolton & John C. Yoo, Op-Ed, Hands Off the Heavens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 
2012, at A31. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Amendment to H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://armedservices.house. 
gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=6fdb326e-9d6d-444d-a330-891ae7341a55. 
 144 Michael Listner, Separation of Powers Battle Over a Space Code of Conduct Heats Up, 
SPACE REV. (May 21, 2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2215/1. 
 145 Michael Listner, EU Takes the Next Shot in the Battle of the Codes, SPACE REV. (June 4, 
2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2092/1. 
 146 Council Decision 2012/281/CFSP, 2012 O.J. (L 140) 68; Listner, supra note 145. 
 147 Listner, supra note 145. 
 148 Outer Space Activities, EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, http://eeas.europa.eu/non-pr 
oliferation-and-disarmament/outer-space-activities/index_en.htm (last visited June 16, 2014). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See, e.g., Michael Listner, U.S. Should Take a Cold, Hard Look at Space Code of 
Conduct, SPACENEWS, Apr. 7, 2014, http://www.spacenews.com/article/opinion/40128us-sho 
uld-take-a-cold-hard-look-at-space-code-of-conduct (citing the potential for greater burdens 
and restrictions on the United States without tangible benefits); Michael Listner, Customary 
International Law: A Troublesome Question for the Code of Conduct?, SPACE REV., Apr. 28, 
2014, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2500/1 (citing the potential for unintentional 
consequences that would legally bind the United States long-term).  See also OBSERVER 
RESEARCH FOUNDATION, AWAITING LAUNCH: PERSPECTIVES ON THE DRAFT ICOC FOR OUTER 
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reemphasized its commitment to an ICOC approach in June 2014, and 
advocated the EU draft as the best conduit for international agreement before 
year’s end.152  While it appears the EU has a strategy to win over countries 
that originally opposed the preliminary EU draft, the toughest challenge for 
the United States remains “the issue of dissent among members of Congress 
about whether a code of [conduct] should be implemented.”153   
III.  ANALYSIS 
While the EU and United States each work diplomatic channels to 
advocate for their own best interests in an ICOC, one thing is certain: both 
have identified an ICOC approach as the best manner to address the issue of 
space debris remediation.  However, if the United States is ultimately to 
succeed in utilizing an ICOC approach, President Obama’s Administration 
will first have to impress upon Congressional opponents that an ICOC 
approach is in the best interest of U.S. national security policy.  This 
argument can most effectively be made by asserting two chief advantages to 
the ICOC approach: (1) it most closely aligns with U.S. national space 
priorities; and (2) it is the most efficacious approach in the short term that 
will lead to a long-term resolution. 
A.  Aligned with National Space Priorities 
Two clear U.S. priorities can be determined from the general principles of 
the current national space policy: the United States is intent on reserving the 
right to use space for national security measures,154 and it views itself, as 
“the leading space-faring nation,”155 a protector of space as a global 
commons.156  Any approach taken toward international agreement that seeks 
the support of the United States in the remediation of space debris will have 
to allow for both of these priorities.157  Most notably, any approach that does 
                                                                                                                   
SPACE ACTIVITIES 19–92 (Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras eds., 2014), 
available at http://orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/report/attachments/awaiting_1 
398688856053.pdf. 
 152 Rose, supra note 10 (“The United States fully support[s] the EU’s ambition of finalizing 
the Code this year, or soon thereafter.”). 
 153 Listner, supra note 145. 
 154 National Space Policy of 2010, supra note 52, at 3 (describing the third and fifth 
principles). 
 155 Id. at 2. 
 156 Id. (describing the first, fourth, and fifth principles). 
 157 Id. at 3 (“In this spirit of cooperation, the United States will adhere to, and proposes that 
other nations recognize and adhere to, the following principles . . . .”). 
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not allow for the priority of national security maneuverability will face 
certain opposition from the White House, Congress, and the U.S. Military.158  
An ICOC approach allows the United States to best uphold these 
priorities.  First, an ICOC allows the United States to maximize its national 
security maneuverability by providing flexibility.159  An ICOC, including the 
draft ICOC prepared by the EU, would place a constraint on U.S. behaviors, 
not its capabilities.160  In other words, the United States would be permitted 
under an ICOC approach to develop whatever space system it deemed 
necessary for its national security or for any other reason.161   
Indeed, an ICOC approach does a better job of this than other potential 
approaches to international agreement.  A binding agreement would place 
too much constraint on the United States, forcing it to concede some of its 
national freedoms in exchange for international agreement.162  A binding 
agreement would also provide the United States with the least amount of 
flexibility to respond to perceived national security threats.163  Unlike a 
binding agreement, an ICOC provides countries with flexibility to address 
highly technical areas of space law, such as space debris remediation.164 
Likewise, a voluntary regime of national policies is not an effective 
option.  While this approach would allow the United States the greatest 
leeway in establishing its own guidelines, it would also provide this freedom 
                                                                                                                   
 158 See id. (listing the use of space for national and homeland security activities as a key U.S. 
principle); supra notes 135–36, 138–44 and accompanying text (describing U.S. Military and 
Congressional opposition to the ICOC approach). 
 159 See Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and 
Nonbinding Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
289, 314 (2012) (“Flexibility to deal with unanticipated circumstances is an important value in 
any legal system, but it is especially so in international space law. . . . Current space law 
achieves this flexibility by using nonbinding instruments . . . .”). 
 160 Defense Hearing, supra note 136, at 15 (“Ambassador Schulte: Sir, it would not do that.  
It would not—it doesn’t constrain . . . capabilities; it constrains behavior.”); Turner Brinton, 
Sessions, Schulte Spar Over Proposed Space Accord, SPACE NEWS (May 13, 2011), http:// 
www.spacenews.com/article/sessions-schulte-spar-accord. 
 161 Defense Hearing, supra note 136, at 15; Brinton, supra note 160. 
 162 See, e.g., CARL Q. CHRISTOL, Space Debris and Military Testing, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
31ST COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 234, 234–43 (1989), reprinted in SPACE 
LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, supra note 81, at 263, 274 (“Formal treaty law makes it 
clear that space activities are subject to important constraints.”); Imburgia, supra note 18, at 
633–34 (discussing potential enforcement mechanisms).  
 163 See Wessel, supra note 159, at 314–15 (discussing how nonbinding instruments allow 
states to respond to developments in technology and research without breaching a legally 
binding commitment and do so quicker due to fewer procedural hurdles at the domestic level). 
 164 Id. at 314–17. 
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to all other space-faring countries.165  National governments would have little 
incentive to set guidelines that would provide concessions to the 
international community.166   
An ICOC, however, reaches a middle ground between these two 
extremes.  It provides national governments the flexibility to take actions to 
defend themselves from perceived threats, while establishing a clear starting 
point for conduct guidelines.167  This starting point provides countries with 
greater certainty of what the final agreement will entail, allowing for greater 
confidence in planning national space activities.168  It also ensures that all 
parties bear some constraint, such that no member country will have 
complete freedom in their outer space activities.169 
Second, an ICOC approach secures the United States’ ability to exert 
leadership in drafting the guidelines put forth for an international agreement.  
A voluntary regime of national policies would clearly provide the United 
States with no direct input into the policies of each country.170  Similarly, a 
                                                                                                                   
 165 Mirmina, supra note 91, at 656–57 (“This approach would ensure a degree of flexibility 
to individual states in the authorization and supervision of space activities.  States like the 
United States that actively regulate private space activities will probably require more detailed 
regulatory provisions . . . than states that lack domestic launch capabilities.”). 
 166 See, e.g., id. at 657 (“[T]he only effective enforcement mechanism when a state fails to 
comply with its obligations under the regime would be public disclosure.  Apart from national 
reporting, however, there is no other immediately available ‘stick’ to use against a state that 
promised to follow a practice but has subsequently failed to do so . . . .”); CHRISTOL, supra note 
162, at 276 (“To have significance [negotiations] would have to result in an agreement in which 
both parties would feel confident that their respective national interests would be protected.”). 
 167 See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing how an ICOC allows member states 
needed flexibility); Mirmina, supra note 91, at 660 (“[A] voluntary code of conduct could later 
evolve into a legally binding instrument.”); see also Stephen Gorove, Another Look at Arms 
Control and at What May be Agreed Upon, II ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN OUTER 
SPACE 109–18 (1987), reprinted in STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW: ISSUES 
AND POLICIES 263, 272 (1991) (“Because of the vital role that satellites can play in strategic 
defense and offense and in view of the almost daily scientific and technological advances in the 
development of new weapons, decision makers are doubly hesitant to agree on measures that 
could jeopardize or adversely affect their country’s security position.”); CHRISTOL, supra note 
93, at 353 (“In the area of military reconnaissance a State may take action perceived by it to be in 
its national interest in the absence of prohibitory legal prescriptions.”). 
 168 See Wessel, supra note 159, at 318 (“Therefore, an analysis of the place of nonbinding 
agreements in the rule of law in outer space must focus on the degree to which international 
space law provides enough certainty for states to plan their activities in outer space.  The 
current nonbinding agreements and planned codes of conduct to a large extent fulfill this goal, 
at least at the current stage of space utilization.”). 
 169 See Krepon, supra note 16 (using the analogy of highway traffic regulations to illustrate 
how some rules, even if they are broken, promote greater safety than having no rules at all). 
 170 Mirmina, supra note 91, at 656 (“The commitment each state assumes [in a voluntary 
adherence regime] is to enforce a national supervisory/regulatory structure.  Practices to 
2014] THE EMPIRE CAN STILL STRIKE BACK  901 
 
United Nations approach to an international agreement would minimize the 
role played by the United States, as the United States would have the same 
level of input as all other STSC members.171  Further, creating a new 
intergovernmental organization to govern an agreement presents too much 
uncertainty in the role the United States would actually play since this group 
does not yet exist.172  Unlike these approaches, an ICOC allows the United 
States to take a strong leadership role in developing the proposed 
guidelines.173  By doing so, the United States is best able to ensure its 
concerns regarding national security and enforcement are represented in the 
final agreement. 
B.  Best Short-Term Approach to Long-Term Resolution 
While some may argue that a binding agreement is the best long-term 
solution to tackling the issue of space debris,174 particularly if the United 
States is able to use its position as a major space-faring power to establish 
favorable regulations with respect to national security maneuverability, a 
binding agreement is unlikely to be established anytime soon.175  General 
international apathy has existed towards using formal channels to create such 
                                                                                                                   
mitigate the accumulation of orbital debris would therefore be implemented through domestic 
regulations and policy.”). 
 171 See id. at 657–58 (“One advantage of pursuing UN-based guidelines is the widespread 
participation of STSC members.  All major space-faring nations are members of the STSC.  
Any of them can take part in the drafting by the Space Debris Working Group of the STSC, 
and it is hoped that the draft’s creation with the approval of the members would enhance the 
likelihood of its enthusiastic adoption and implementation in their respective capitals.”); 
McDermott, supra note 39, at 158 (discussing the greater likelihood for success of a non-UN 
based approach such that the number of nations involved in negotiations is reduced). 
 172 See supra notes 110, 112–13 and accompanying text (discussing specific concerns that 
exist in an approach involving the development of a new international organization made up 
of individual member states). 
 173 See MICHAEL KREPON, SPACE: A CODE OF CONDUCT 2 (2008), available at http://www.st 
imson.org/books-reports/space-a-code-of-conduct/ (“There are no more than a dozen major 
space-faring nations that can launch their own satellites.  If most or all of these nations could 
agree on a code of conduct, they would strengthen international norms and make it less likely 
that outliers will act otherwise.  If the [sixty-five-nation] Conference on Disarmament 
continues to be deadlocked, the United States could initiate negotiations among major space-
faring nations to establish rules of the road.”). 
 174 E.g., Imburgia, supra note 18 (arguing that a binding international agreement is the only 
feasible solution to the threat of space debris). 
 175 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (describing the impracticality that a 
binding agreement can be reached); see also CHRISTOL, supra note 93, at 349–50 (discussing 
the time frame for the creation of the five major UN agreements). 
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a binding agreement for at least the past twenty years.176  However, an ICOC 
approach offers a short-term resolution that moves the international 
community towards a more permanent solution to the remediation of space 
debris.177  An ICOC is the best approach for the United States in the short-
term, particularly regarding national security maneuverability, because: (1) it 
can be accomplished quickly; (2) an ICOC approach has proven successful 
for the United States military in the past; and (3) it offers achievable progress 
towards a potential longer-term solution. 
1.  Can Be Accomplished Quickly 
An ICOC has the benefit of a speedy enactment versus other international 
agreement alternatives.  By design, an ICOC allows for a faster approval 
process.  Unlike a binding agreement, United Nations agreement, or new 
intergovernmental organization agreement, an ICOC is primarily drafted 
before the parties are assembled at the negotiation table.178  This has the 
benefit of limiting the vast amounts of negotiation to the edges of the 
agreement, rather than bogging down the process with deliberations over the 
essence of the agreement.179  Granted, even under this approach, in order to 
increase its chances of passage, the United States would still have to consider 
other national parties’ perspectives when drafting an ICOC.180  But, the 
distinction with this approach is that by taking the vast amount of the drafting 
process out of negotiation, the ultimate approval process is greatly sped up.181  
Upon submitting its draft ICOC, the United States would be able to devote its 
efforts to diplomatic persuasion rather than perpetual negotiation. 
                                                                                                                   
 176 STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW: ISSUES AND POLICIES 170–71 (1991). 
 177 See supra note 167 and accompanying text (describing the ICOC approach as a 
compromise between complete freedom for space-faring nations and an obtrusively 
constrictive agreement). 
 178 See supra note 132 (discussing how the EU ICOC was drafted prior to outreach seeking 
international support and ratification). 
 179 See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental Problem 9 (Office of 
Technology Assessment, Background Paper No. OTA-BP-ISC-72, Sept. 1990), available at 
http://www.ota.fas.org/reports/9033.pdf (“[W]hen addressed in a broad multilateral context in 
which states having no current capability to launch objects into space would participate, the 
subject has a high potential for becoming the subject of acrimonious debate in which the 
technical issues and solutions could be lost.”). 
 180 See, e.g., CHRISTOL, supra note 162, at 276 (“To have significance [negotiations] would 
have to result in an agreement in which both parties would feel confident that their respective 
interests would be protected.”). 
 181 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (describing how an ICOC approach 
minimizes the likelihood for futile and acrimonious negotiations). 
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In addition, the number of parties that the United States would need to 
court to create a truly international agreement is relatively small.  With no 
more than a dozen space-faring countries,182 the United States would not 
have to exert time and diplomatic energy attempting to have every country 
sign onto an agreement.  Indeed, if the United States could convince most of 
the space-faring group to sign on, it is more likely that other countries will 
fall in line,183 or at least not pose a threat to the agreement’s effectiveness.184 
Further, the ICOC approach allows the United States to work around 
formal governmental structures that might present roadblocks to the passage 
of an agreement.  For example, an ICOC does not require formal state action 
to be created.185  Indeed, national space agencies or private space operators 
can agree to be bound by an ICOC without having national agreement at the 
international level.186  Allowing these groups to opt-in to adherence places 
additional pressure on the national entity, thereby encouraging a faster 
agreement and a more comprehensive group of bound parties.187  
2.  Has a Proven Track Record 
ICOCs are not a new approach to international agreement for the United 
States.188  Indeed, the United States has relied on ICOCs in the past to govern 
troop movements in close proximity to Soviet Union forces,189 arms 
proliferation agreements,190 and crewmember policies for the International 
                                                                                                                   
 182 KREPON, supra note 173, at 2. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See McDermott, supra note 39 (discussing how a large number of nations involved in 
negotiations of an ICOC can thwart its feasibility); supra note 179 and accompanying text 
(discussing how acrimonious negotiations over the substance of an ICOC can thwart its 
feasibility). 
 185 Mirmina, supra note 91, at 659. 
 186 Id. 
 187 See id. (“A code of conduct on orbital debris can be created in the absence of state action, 
at the initiative of space agencies or private operators active in outer space, and can introduce 
‘best practices’ against which state practice can later be measured.”). 
 188 See supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text (discussing prior successful ICOC use by 
the U.S. military and private groups between 1972 and 2007). 
 189 See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (describing ICOC use between the U.S. 
and Soviet Union governments in 1972 and 1989 concerning military movements); KREPON, 
supra note 173 (“The US Army, Navy, and Air Force all abide by codes of conduct when 
operating in close proximity to Russian forces.  These ‘rules of the road’ were established in 
executive agreements.” (citation omitted)). 
 190 See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing ICOCs concerning arms 
proliferation utilized during the presidency of George W. Bush). 
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Space Station.191  The United States can look to these earlier ICOCs and be 
confident that utilizing an ICOC approach for space debris remediation can 
be a successful method for achieving simultaneous national security aims. 
While the use of these prior ICOCs provides the United States with 
confidence in a successful implementation of future military ICOCs, it also 
provides the United States with institutional knowledge to aid in that pursuit.  
The negotiations that occurred surrounding prior ICOCs, as well as any 
diplomatic relationships that developed, can be utilized to ensure the smooth 
deployment of a future ICOC addressing space debris remediation.  Further, 
it is likely from these earlier efforts that the United States is well aware of 
the views that each of the space-faring countries holds regarding 
international space policies and national security implications.  All of this 
information will aid the United States in drafting an ICOC with a high 
likelihood of success by helping to make certain a faster and more 
comprehensive framework for agreement. 
3.  Will Serve as a Building Block 
Prior ICOCs also provide evidence that voluntary ICOCs can serve as a 
building block for longer-term or legally binding agreements.192  In 
particular, the experience of the ICOC addressing crew policies abroad the 
International Space Station provides a clear example of how this might 
work.193  After establishing an ICOC about crew procedures among the 
partner states, the parties included a provision invoking this ICOC in the 
formalized foundation of the International Space Station partnership.194  
Specifically, this provision requires partner states to observe the ICOC, 
inferring that legal consequences might exist for violations.195   
The International Space Station example illustrates the building block 
effect an ICOC can have.  By agreeing to voluntary compliance in the 
beginning through an ICOC, the International Space Station parties were 
moved closer to the formalization of a longer-term partnership that was built 
upon their prior agreements.196  Early agreements created through ICOCs can 
establish initial trust, shared sacrifice, and shared commitment to a common 
                                                                                                                   
 191 See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing a 2005 ICOC regarding 
International Space Station crewmember policies). 
 192 Mirmina, supra note 91, at 659. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196  Id. 
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goal—all ingredients necessary for the success of a long-term partnership.  
More importantly, for those primarily concerned with the threat posed by 
space debris, an ICOC can provide immediate action, albeit more limited 
than a comprehensive longer-term approach, while that longer-term approach 
continues to be hammered out. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A threat such as space debris that is fundamentally international in scope 
requires a fundamentally international approach to resolve it.  However, past 
U.S. action has clearly shown a resistance to accept proposed international 
resolutions that inhibit U.S. national security maneuverability.  The United 
States will not approve any proposal that thwarts its ability to use outer space 
for national security defense.  Equally important, the United States is highly 
unlikely to take an approach that would minimize its role as a major space-
faring nation by preventing it to exert a proportionate amount of influence 
over the drafting of guidelines that seek to control national space policies. 
An ICOC presents a path of achieving the greatest impact towards space 
debris remediation while maximizing national security maneuverability.  
This approach offers the best path forward because it is so closely aligned 
with U.S. space principles.  Any ICOC would allow the United States great 
flexibility to maintain hawkish military capabilities in outer space should the 
need arise.  Because an ICOC merely places restraint on behaviors that 
generate space debris, not military capabilities, it offers a realistic solution to 
the issue at hand that can survive the great scrutiny of Congressional 
Republicans and DOD officials focused on national security.  In addition, it 
allows the United States to exert greater control at the forefront of the 
drafting process.  Unlike more formal alternatives that rely on consensus, an 
ICOC ensures that the United States can control the negotiation over final 
guidelines from the beginning. 
Further, an ICOC offers a practical solution that can provide a framework 
for a future longer-term solution, whether it is binding or not.  Because it 
does not rely on a formal deliberative body to produce the guidelines, an 
ICOC approach can be achieved relatively quickly.  Indeed, with U.S. 
support behind the state-sponsored EU draft, the potential for an endorsed 
ICOC in a relatively short period of time is greatly increased. 
This approach both builds upon past U.S. success with ICOCs and offers 
achievable progress towards the successful ratification of a more 
comprehensive solution farther down the road.  Because the U.S. military has 
already employed ICOCs, particularly with respect to recent space law 
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issues, it is likely to be more willing to embrace the predictability of an 
ICOC approach over other more dubious solutions.  In addition, the Obama 
Administration can point to these successful prior uses of ICOCs to assuage 
the concerns of congressional Republicans and DOD officials.   
The threat of space debris to future space missions is clear as a result of 
incidents like that in 2009 affecting the International Space Station.  As the 
international community reaches a technological maturity that allows easier 
and more long-term access to space, the implications of space debris become 
even greater.  We must devise a solution that will actually address the 
problem, reversing the annual increase of objects in space while also holding 
space-faring parties responsible for cleaning up their proprietary space 
debris.  As a leading space power, the United States clearly has a large role 
in this.  However, to be ultimately successful, a proposed solution must have 
a realistic chance of approval.  An ICOC offers the best balance of carving 
out actual progress on this issue and doing so while maintaining the United 
States’ need for a high degree of national security maneuverability.  As it has 
done throughout its history, the United States should take a leadership role in 
ensuring movement toward a true resolution by embracing an ICOC 
approach to space debris and thereby providing a responsible framework for 
the rest of the international community to follow. 
 
 
